Touro Law Review
Volume 35

Number 1

Article 10

2019

Canines in the Classroom Redux: Applying the ADA or the IDEA to
Determine Whether a Student Should Be Allowed to Be
Accompanied by a Service Animal at a Primary or Secondary
Educational Institution
Rebecca J. Huss

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview
Part of the Disability Law Commons, and the Education Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Huss, Rebecca J. (2019) "Canines in the Classroom Redux: Applying the ADA or the IDEA to Determine
Whether a Student Should Be Allowed to Be Accompanied by a Service Animal at a Primary or Secondary
Educational Institution," Touro Law Review: Vol. 35: No. 1, Article 10.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss1/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For
more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

Huss: Canines in the Classroom Redux

CANINES IN THE CLASSROOM REDUX: APPLYING THE
ADA OR THE IDEA TO DETERMINE WHETHER
A STUDENT SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO BE ACCOMPANIED
BY A SERVICE ANIMAL AT A PRIMARY OR SECONDARY
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION
Rebecca J. Huss*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(hereinafter “IDEA”), every school district receiving federal funds is
required to have policies in place to provide a free appropriate public
education (hereinafter “FAPE”) to students with disabilities.1 School
districts are responsible for developing an individualized education
program (hereinafter “IEP”) for each student with a disability.2 One
of the attributes of the IDEA is the requirement that administrative
procedures must be exhausted prior to the filing of any lawsuit based
on the violation of the IDEA—an issue that has been at the heart of
many cases in this field of law.3
School districts are also subject to the Americans with
Disabilities Act (hereinafter “ADA”), which prohibits discrimination
on the basis of a disability, regardless of an individual’s age, by public
entities and places of accommodation.4 ADA regulations require
* Rebecca J. Huss 2019. Rebecca J. Huss, Valparaiso University Law School, Associate Dean
for Academic Affairs, Professor of Law & Phyllis and Richard Duesenberg Chair in Law.
1 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2018); 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2018). See generally LAURA
ROTHSTEIN & JULIA IRZYK, DISABILITIES AND THE LAW §§ 2:3-2:5 (4th ed. 2018) (discussing
the history of the IDEA).
2 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i) (2018).
3 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2018). Rebecca J. Huss, Canines in the Classroom Revisited: Recent
Developments Relating to Students’ Utilization of Service Animals at Primary and Secondary
Educational Institutions, 9 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 1, 15, 20-23 (2016) [hereinafter Huss,
Revisited] (discussing some of the cases where exhaustion of administrative remedies was an
issue).
4 See generally Title II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2018), and Title III, 42 U.S.C. §§
12181-12189 (2018). Title II of the ADA applies to state and local governments. 28 C.F.R.
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entities to “make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or
procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid
discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can
demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter
the nature of the service, program, or activity.”5 One example of a
modification is allowing an individual with a disability to utilize a
service animal in a place where animals are otherwise prohibited.6
As courts grapple with applying the Supreme Court’s decision
in Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools7 in the broader context of the
intersection of the IDEA and the ADA, parents and school districts
must continue to determine under what circumstances students are
allowed to be accompanied by their service dogs in a primary and
secondary school environment.8

§ 35.104 (2018). Title III of the ADA applies to a place of public accommodation, which
includes “[a] nursery, elementary, secondary, . . . private school, or other place of education.”
28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2018). In addition, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides “[n]o
otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his
disability, . . . be denied the benefits of . . . any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2018). Entities receiving funds indirectly are covered under the
Rehabilitation Act and, because all states receive federal funding for educational
programming, local school districts would also be covered by the Rehabilitation Act.
ROTHSTEIN & IRZYK, supra note 1, § 2.2. Because the Rehabilitation Act is commonly
referenced secondarily to the IDEA and ADA, it will not be analyzed separately in this Article.
However, occasionally the Rehabilitation Act may provide an important basis for a claim,
especially in a dispute with a private school. E.g., Bardelli v. Allied Servs. Inst. of Rehab.
Med., No. 3:14-0691, 2015 BL 61005 (M.D. Penn. Mar. 6, 2015). See also Berardelli v. Allied
Servs. Inst. of Rehab. Med., 900 F.3d 104, 120-25 (3d Cir. 2018) (remanding case for further
proceedings and applying the ADA service animal regulations to the case involving the
Rehabilitation Act). A private school that does not accept any federal funding would not be
subject to the IDEA or Rehabilitation Act but would still be subject to the ADA.
5 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i) (2018) (setting forth language in Title II of the ADA
regulations). Similar language is found in the Title III regulations. 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(a)
(2018).
6 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(a) (2018); 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(c)(1) (2018) (stating generally an entity
“shall” modify its “policies, practices, or procedures to permit the use of a service animal by
an individual with a disability”).
7 Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017).
8 See, e.g., Rebecca Everett, Determined Teen Finally Allowed to Bring Service Dog to
School, NJ.COM, http://www.nj.com/camden/index.ssf/2017/02/school_allows_service_dog_i
n_school_after_months_o.html (last updated Feb. 2, 2017, 10:38 AM) (providing illustration
of recent dispute between a student and school district). In addition to allowing students to
bring a service animal to school, school districts may need to allow students to be accompanied
by their service animals on school buses. Melanie Velez, Regional Director, OCR Complaint
#04-17-1114, Letter to Shane Barnett, Superintendent, Cullman County Schools, U.S. DEP’T
EDUC., OFF. FOR C.R. (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/invest
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This short Article will highlight some of the issues impacting
this decision-making process.9 It focuses on issues relating to students
in primary and secondary schools after the Supreme Court’s decision
in Fry.10 This Article is limited to issues relating to federal law,
although several states have laws that may provide additional rights to
students.11
Part II of this Article sets forth a brief background of the Fry
case, including the Supreme Court decision, and analyzes some of the
arguments made by the parties on remand at the district court level.12
Part II also reports on cases relating to service animals in schools
applying the analysis set forth in the Fry decision.13 Part III of this
Article explains the relevant ADA regulations relating to service

igations/more/04171114-a.pdf (finding a violation of Title II of the ADA and discussing the
implementation of a Resolution Agreement after a student was refused permission to bring his
service animal on a school bus).
9 The author has written about the issue of service and assistance animals in previous
articles. Readers interested in exploring this area of the law more fully are encouraged to read
the author’s work on this issue. Rebecca J. Huss, Canines in the Classroom: Issues Relating
to Service Animals in Primary and Secondary Educational Institutions After Fry v. Napoleon
Community Schools, 24 ANIMAL L. 53 (2018) [hereinafter Huss, After Fry]; Huss, Revisited,
supra note 3; Rebecca J. Huss, Canines in the Classroom: Service Animals in Primary and
Secondary Educational Institutions, 4 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 11 (2011) [hereinafter Huss,
Classroom]. Most of author’s previous work can be accessed via the Social Science Research
Network at http://ssrn.com/author=330506. This Article is focused on service and assistance
animals partnered with individual students. A discussion of legal issues relating to the
incorporation of therapy animals in a school environment can be found in Rebecca J. Huss &
Aubrey H. Fine, Legal and Policy Issues for Classrooms with Animals, in HOW ANIMALS HELP
STUDENTS LEARN: RESEARCH AND PRACTICE FOR EDUCATORS AND MENTAL-HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS 27-37 (Nancy R. Gee et al. eds., 2017). This Article does not discuss the
significant ethical and welfare issues involved in utilizing service animals as living
accommodations. Some of the author’s previous work relating to service and assistance
animals has analyzed this issue. Huss, Revisited, supra note 3, at *4 n.6; Huss, Classroom,
supra, at 18-19 (citing to the author’s earlier work on ethical issues and providing additional
references).
10 This Article does not analyze all the other circumstances in which the Fry decision
impacts the intersection of the IDEA and the ADA. For example, there have been cases
relating to school districts’ obligations concerning the alleged mistreatment of students due to
the use of a mechanical restraint and the refusal to allow a therapist to accompany a student in
school. P.G. v. Rutherford Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 3:17-cv-01115, 2018 WL 2416230 (M.D.
Tenn. May, 29 2018) (allegations of improper restraint require exhaustion of remedies under
the IDEA); K.M. v. Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist., No. 1:17-cv-01431-LJO-JLT, 2018 WL
2096326 (E.D. Cal. May, 7 2018) (finding ADA claims relating to refusal of school to allow
therapist are not subject to the IDEA exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement).
11 See Huss, Revisited, supra note 3, at 38-46; Huss, Classroom, supra note 9, at 46-51
(analyzing state laws that may provide additional rights to students).
12 See infra notes 17-88 and accompanying text (discussing Fry case).
13 See infra notes 89-96.
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animals and highlights some of the issues concerning the application
of those regulations to disputes between advocates of students and
schools.14 Part IV considers why the IDEA and its regulations might
support a student’s request to be accompanied by a service animal in
school, even in the absence of such a right under the ADA.15 Part V
concludes the Article by providing guidance for advocates and school
districts given the challenges that can arise when incorporating service
animals in a primary and secondary school environment.16
II.

FRY V. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS

About nine years from the time Ehlena Fry began training with
her service dog Wonder, the Supreme Court issued a decision that
remanded her case back to the Sixth Circuit for further proceedings.17
As of the writing of this Article, the case was ongoing.18
A.

History of the Case

Service dog Wonder was trained to assist Ehlena,19 who has
cerebral palsy, with mobility and physical tasks.20
Ehlena’s
elementary school initially refused permission to allow Wonder at the
school but then agreed to a trial period.21 After being informed by the
14

See infra notes 98-133 and accompanying text (discussing recent cases).
See infra notes 135-48 and accompanying text (discussing IDEA regulations that may
support an argument a service animal should be included in a student’s IEP).
16 See infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text (providing guidance to advocates and
school districts).
17 Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743, 759 (2017); Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch.,
788 F.3d 622, 624 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc). Wonder had been retired from acting as Ehlena’s
service animal by the time of the Supreme Court’s decision. Richard Wolf, ‘Ruff’ Justice:
Supreme Court Rules for Disabled Girl, Service Dog, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com
/story/news/politics/2017/02/22/supreme-court-disabled-girl-wonder-service-dog/98214948/
(last updated Feb. 22, 2017, 2:32 PM).
18 See infra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing the status of the case at the time of
the writing of this Article).
19 No disrespect is intended by the use of the Ehlena’s first name. It is being used merely
to simplify the discussion of the case.
20 Fry, 788 F.3d at 624. Ehlena was initially not able to handle Wonder independently, but
Ehlena developed this ability. Id. The issue of whether a student is able to “handle” a service
animal on his or her own has been raised as an issue in other cases, although it was not the
basis for Napoleon Community Schools rejecting the Frys’ request to allow Wonder at school.
See infra notes 125-34 and accompanying text (discussing issues relating to an individual
acting as the handler of a service animal).
21 Fry, 788 F.3d at 624.
15
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school that Wonder would not be allowed back the following year, the
Frys filed a complaint with the Office of Civil Rights at the Department
of Education (hereinafter “DOE OCR”) under the ADA and Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act.22 After the DOE OCR established the
school violated the ADA for refusing to allow Wonder to accompany
Ehlena, the school agreed to allow Ehlena to attend school with
Wonder.23 However, the next fall, the Frys enrolled Ehlena in a school
district that had no opposition to Wonder.24
In December 2012, the Frys filed suit against Napoleon
Community Schools seeking damages under the ADA and Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act based on failure to accommodate.25 The
school’s motion to dismiss was granted by the district court, which
held the IDEA’s exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement
applied to the Frys’ claims because Ehlena’s IEP would “certainly
have to be modified in order to articulate the policies and practices that
would apply to the dog.”26
In affirming the district court’s judgment, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals cited to section 1415(l) of the IDEA that provides
that plaintiffs are required to exhaust IDEA procedures,
notwithstanding a lack of IDEA claims in the complaint, if the relief
sought is “also available” under the IDEA.27 The majority opinion

22
Id. For examples of other administrative decisions relating to service animals in schools,
see Huss, Revisited, supra note 3, at 27-35. Some recent administrative actions are also
included in the citations to this Article.
23 Fry, 788 F.3d at 624.
24 Id.
25 Id. The following injuries were alleged:
denial of equal access to school facilities, denial of the use of Wonder as
a service dog, interference with [Ehlena’s] ability to form a bond with
Wonder, denial of the opportunity to interact with other students at Ezra
Eby Elementary School, and psychological harm caused by the
defendants’ refusal to accommodate [Ehlena] as a disabled person.
Id. The failure to accommodate allegedly occurred between fall 2009 and spring 2012. Id.
26 Id. at 624-25.
27 Id. at 625. The IDEA provision states:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights,
procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or
other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities,
except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief
that is also available under this subchapter, the procedures under
subsections (f) and (g) shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be
required had the action been brought under this subchapter.
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found that the exhaustion requirement would apply because the Frys’
suit turned “on the same questions that would have determined the
outcome of IDEA procedures, had they been used to resolve the
dispute.”28 In contrast, the dissenting opinion considered the claim
noneducational in nature.29 The dissenting opinion distinguished
between the ADA and IDEA, stating “the ADA’s focus is on ensuring
access; the IDEA’s focus is on providing individualized education.”30
The Supreme Court granted the Fry’s request for certiorari.31
B.

Supreme Court Decision32

The Supreme Court’s concise opinion began by describing the
IDEA and the legislative history of section 1415(l).33 It then set out
the facts and history of the case.34 The Court acknowledged section
1415(l) “requires that a plaintiff exhaust the IDEA’s procedures before
filing an action under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, or similar laws
when (but only when) her suit ‘seek[s] relief that is also available’
under the IDEA.”35 It found in order “to meet that statutory standard,
20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). This provision was part of the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act
of 1986 which amended the law that is now referred to as the IDEA. Pub. L. No. 99-372, § 3,
100 Stat. 796, 797 (1986).
28 Fry, 788 F.3d at 627.
29 Id. at 631-32 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting). However, even if the accommodation sought
was educational in nature, the dissenting opinion argued there were facts indicating that
exhaustion of administrative remedies would have been futile in this case and thus exhaustion
would be excused. Id. The dissenting opinion also cited to a school policy that did not permit
a certified “service dog” but allowed a “guide dog” and stated the school could have honored
the request “simply by modifying the school policy allowing guide dogs to include service
dogs.” Id. at 631-32, 634.
30 Id. at 633.
31 Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 136 S. Ct. 2540, 2540 (2016). The Solicitor General was
invited to file a brief in the action. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at *1, Fry,
136 S. Ct. 2540 (2016) (No. 15-497), 2016 WL 4524537. In urging the Supreme Court to
grant certiorari, the United States’ brief stated “[t]he question presented raises an important
and recurring issue that has significant consequences for children with disabilities who seek
to vindicate their rights under federal anti-discrimination statutes.” Id. at *11.
32 Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017). Justice Kagan delivered the opinion
of the Court with Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Sotomayor joining the opinion. Id. at 748. Justice Alito, with Justice Thomas, concurred in
the judgment and concurred in part. Id. at 748, 759. Justice Alito’s concurrence asserted the
Court provided misleading clues and these suggested clues “are likely to confuse and lead
courts astray.” Id. at 759 (Alito & Thomas, JJ., concurring). For analysis of the briefs and
oral argument in the Supreme Court case, see Huss, After Fry, supra note 9, at 59-65.
33 Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 748-50.
34 Id. at 750-52.
35 Id. at 752 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l)).
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a suit must seek relief for the denial of a FAPE, because that is the only
relief the IDEA makes available.”36
The Court attempted to address the concern about plaintiffs
circumventing the statute through “artful pleading” by establishing a
gravamen standard.37 It emphasized the “use (or non-use) of particular
labels and terms is not what matters.”38 The Court distinguished
between the focus of the statutes, with the coverage and goals of the
IDEA being “individually tailored educational services” compared
with the purposes of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act to ensure “nondiscriminatory access to public institutions.”39
In order to determine “whether the gravamen of a complaint
against a school concerns the denial of a FAPE, or instead addresses
disability-based discrimination,” the Court provided clues for lower
courts to utilize.40 For example, two hypothetical questions could be
asked:
First, could the plaintiff have brought essentially the
same claim if the alleged conduct had occurred at a
public facility that was not a school—say, a public
theater or library? And second, could an adult at the
school—say, an employee or visitor—have pressed
essentially the same grievance?41
In the event the answer to those two questions is yes, “a complaint that
does not expressly allege a denial of a FAPE is also unlikely to be truly
about that subject.”42 In contrast, if the answer to these questions is
no, “then the complaint probably does concern a FAPE, even if it does
not explicitly say so.”43
36

Id.
Id. at 755 (stating what should matter is “the crux—or, in legal-speak, the gravamen—of
the plaintiff’s complaint, setting aside any attempts at artful pleading”).
38 Id. As an example, a party could omit the terms FAPE or IEP in the complaint. Id. The
Court continued “a ‘magic words’ approach would make § 1415(l)’s exhaustion rule too easy
to bypass.” Id.
39 Id. at 756. The Court acknowledged there is overlap in coverage and some conduct would
be a violation of all the statutes. Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. The Court also provided examples to guide courts. Id. In one, a student using a
wheelchair, who is not alleging a denial of a FAPE, sues a school for discrimination under the
ADA because of a lack of ramps to access a building. Id. Using the Court’s analysis,
exhaustion under § 1415(l) would not be required in that case. Id. In another example, the
Court used a hypothetical of a student with a learning disability alleging the failure to provide
37
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The Court also indicated the history of a case could also be
considered by courts.44
[A] court may consider that a plaintiff has previously
invoked the IDEA’s formal procedures to handle the
dispute—thus starting to exhaust the Act’s remedies
before switching midstream. . . . A plaintiff’s initial
choice to pursue that process may suggest that she is
indeed seeking relief for the denial of a FAPE.45
The Court remanded the case back to the Sixth Circuit given it did not
have sufficient information about the history of the proceedings and
the Sixth Circuit had not determined whether the gravamen of the Frys’
complaint sought relief for the denial of a FAPE.46
C.

Case on Remand
1.

Remand to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals

As with any standard established by the Supreme Court, the
application of such tests can be complicated by the factual record.47
After all, the Frys and the school district did not have the benefit of the
standard at the time the underlying events occurred and litigation
began.48 On remand the Frys argued the issue was can the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals “determine whether the substance of the complaint
filed by [Ehlena] for violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act
and the Rehabilitation Act seeks redress for the Defendants-Appellee’s
denial of a free and appropriate public education?”49 The Frys urged
the Court of Appeals to remand the case for further discovery in order
to establish the factual record.50
remedial tutoring suing under the ADA. Id. at 756-57. The exhaustion requirement in §
1415(l)’s would apply in that case. Id. at 757.
44 Id.
45 Id. The Court stated “prior pursuit of the IDEA’s administrative remedies will often
provide strong evidence that the substance of a plaintiff’s claim concerns the denial of a FAPE,
even if the complaint never explicitly uses that term.” Id.
46 Id. at 758.
47 See infra notes 53-82 and accompanying text (discussing filings at the district court level
based on activities of the parties prior to the Supreme Court decision).
48 See supra notes 19-30 and accompanying text (discussing history of the case).
49 Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants Stacy Fry, Brent Fry, and Ef, a Minor, by Her Next Friends
Stacy Fry and Brent Fry at 7, Fry, 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017) (No. 14-1137), 2017 WL 2222829,
at *v.
50 Id. at *12.
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The school district argued exhaustion of administrative
remedies under the IDEA was required because the history of the
proceedings would support a finding the Frys sought relief for denial
of a FAPE.51 Citing to the “factual nature of the relevant information,”
the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district court in the
summer of 2017 to determine “whether ‘the Frys invoked the IDEA’s
dispute resolution process before bringing this suit.’”52
2.

District Court Filings
i.

Motions for Summary Judgment

Back at the district court level, all the parties filed motions for
summary judgment.53 The Frys moved to dismiss the defendants’
affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.54
The Frys argued the issue is that the gravamen of their complaint
sought relief for discriminatory acts committed by the defendants
under ADA Title II and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and thus
such claims are not subject to the exhaustion requirements of the
IDEA.55
The Frys’ motion for summary judgment utilized language in
the Supreme Court’s opinion to support their argument that the
gravamen of their claim was not the denial of a FAPE.56 They
51

Defendants-Appellees’ Supplemental Brief at 11, Fry, 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017) (No. 141137), 2017 WL 2629921, at *3. Among other things, to support its contention that the
gravamen of the complaint is a denial of a FAPE, the school district cited to the Frys’
participation in an IDEA mediation process. Id. at *1-2.
52 Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., No. 14-1137, 2017 WL 10129249, at *1 (6th Cir. July 21,
2017) (citing to 137 S. Ct. at 758) (reversing and remanding the case to district court).
53 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Dismiss Defendants’ Affirmative
Defense of Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies, Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., No. 1215507 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 9, 2018) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ February 2018 Motion for Summary
Judgment]; Defendants Napoleon Community Schools, Jackson County ISD and Pamela
Barnes’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., No. 12-15507 (E.D.
Mich. Feb. 12, 2018) [hereinafter Defendants’ February 2018 Motion for Summary
Judgment].
54 Plaintiffs’ February 2018 Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 53, at 2.
55 Id. at 8.
56 Id. at 16. The language cited to from the Supreme Court’s decision included that the
complaint “contains no allegation about the denial of a FAPE or about any deficiency in E.F.’s
IEP . . . [nor does it] accuse the school even in general terms of refusing to provide the
educational instruction and services E.F. needs” and “nothing in the nature of the Frys’ suit
suggests any implicit focus on the adequacy of E.F.’s education.” Id. (citing to Fry, 137 S. Ct.
at 758).
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reiterated that the Supreme Court’s decision supported the premise that
the Frys’ claim met the initial questions presented using the gravamen
test.57 The Frys articulated the question for the district court is
whether, given the first parts of the gravamen test were resolved in
their favor, “the Frys’ initial participation in IDEA administrative
procedures convincingly establishes the gravamen of the case actually
is rooted in the denial of a FAPE.”58
The Frys acknowledged they initially participated in the
IDEA’s administrative procedures prior to their shift to litigation but
articulated three reasons their claim was not about denial of a FAPE.59
The Frys argued that the Napoleon Community Schools admitted all
accommodation requests for special education were funneled through
the IDEA process, even if there was no claim for denial of a FAPE,
and thus the Frys did not invoke the IDEA’s administrative
procedures.60 The Frys also argued they previously testified “that their
participation in the IDEA mediation process simply was a means to
continue the conversation with the school about granting E.F. access
to her service animal at Ezra Eby, not an attempt to alter the contents
of the IEP.”61 Finally, the Frys argued other courts applying the
Supreme Court test to “similar cases have determined that exhaustion
of the IDEA’s administrative procedures was not required.”62 Given
these arguments, the Frys reasoned the district court should “hold the
Frys’ claim is not subject to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirements, and

57 Id. at 15-16. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (setting forth the first two
questions in the Supreme Court’s decision).
58 Plaintiffs’ February 2018 Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 53, at 17.
59 Id. at 18.
60 Id. The Frys presented as evidence the letters that were submitted requesting access rights
for the service dog and the deposition by the Superintendent supporting the Frys’ premise that
any accommodation request was funneled through the IEP process. Id. at 18-23.
61 Id. at 18-19. The agreement by the Frys to mediation came at the end of a meeting where
the school had rejected the request to allow the service animal and the Frys were asked to
check a box listing five options. Id. at 24. At Stacy Fry’s deposition she stated “[w]e had to
check a box and we wanted to continue the conversation. . . . [W]e always believed it was
[E.F.]’s right independent of the education plan to have the service dog with her, but this was
the only means for us to continue the conversation with the school.” Id. at 24 (fourth alteration
in original).
62 Id. at 19.
The Frys acknowledged that a limited number of courts have had the
opportunity to apply the test set out in Fry, but discussed two cases where plaintiffs initially
participated in IDEA procedures but, like the Frys’ case, the wrongs were “beyond the scope
of the denial of a FAPE.” Id. at 28-32.
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strike the Defendants’ affirmative defense of Failure to Exhaust
Administrative Remedies.”63
The defendants’ summary judgment motion argued the history
of the proceedings supports a finding that the Frys sought relief for
denial of a FAPE; therefore, exhaustion of administrative remedies
was required.64 The defendants focused on aspects of the IDEA that
relate to students’, in this case Ehlena’s, development of
independence.65 Because Ehlena’s qualification for special education
services was only due to her physical disability, the defendants
asserted the educational goals were connected with the issues in which
she received services—to help her develop mobility and
independence.66 Essentially the defendants argued “[t]he request for a
special education student to have access to a tool to ‘develop’ her
‘independence’ is indeed a request for [a] FAPE.”67 This assertion that
the request for the service animal was a related service to “develop
independence” was supported by the defendants’ citation to several
regulations governing the IDEA.68 The defendants distinguished
between an entity merely granting access to a person with a service
animal and one who demands assistance with “developing
independence, and to provide therapy to learn to use an assistive
device.”69
The defendants also argued that language in written
correspondence from the Frys and their representatives referenced the
IDEA’s requirements and the denial of a FAPE in connection with their
63

Id. at 19.
Defendants’ February 2018 Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 53, at 3-4. Even
if the district court determines that relief was available under the IDEA and the ADA, the
defendants argued the IDEA exhaustion provision would apply. Id. at 32.
65 Id. at 20 (citing to testimony by Stacy Fry that a goal was to “develop independence in
her movement, and to become independent in ‘utilizing the service dog’” (citing to Exhibit 12,
at 12), and Brent Fry’s testimony that an “‘educational goal’ [for E.F.] that year was ‘to be
100 percent independent when using Wonder’” (citing to Exhibit 13, at 14)). The defendants
made similar arguments to the Supreme Court and on remand to the Sixth Circuit. Brief for
Respondents at 43-44, Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 136 S. Ct. 2540 (2016) (No. 15-497), 2016
WL 5667526, at *47-48; Defendants-Appellees’ Supplemental Brief at 27-32, Fry, 137 S. Ct.
743 (2017) (No. 14-1137), 2017 WL 2629921, at *19-24.
66 Defendants’ February 2018 Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 53, at 26. The
defendants also pointed out testimony that an educational goal was for Ehlena to use the dog
independently—“to learn to use the service dog independently.” Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 26-30. See infra notes 135-48 and accompanying text (discussing IDEA regulations
that could be applied to support including a service animal in an IEP).
69 Defendants’ February 2018 Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 53, at 30.
64
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request to have Ehlena be accompanied by her service animal at
school.70 The defendants contended that the Frys’ attendance at an IEP
meeting, where the service animal was the main issue of the IEP, and
their disagreement with the results of that IEP meeting triggered the
IDEA dispute resolution process, including the mediation process.71 If
the Frys viewed the service animal request as distinct from the special
education curriculum, the defendants asserted the Frys should have
declined attendance at the IEP meeting and not participated in the
IDEA mediation process.72
ii.

Responses to Motions for Summary
Judgment

In their response to the Frys’ motion for partial summary
judgment, the defendants argued the facts of this case were the type of
facts the Supreme Court raised concerns about, specifically shifting
litigation strategies midstream.73 They also reiterated that, given the
full context of the services provided to Ehlena and the coverage of
IDEA, the claim seeks relief for the denial of a FAPE.74 The
defendants also rejected the Frys’ assertion that the Supreme Court had
already determined the first clue (in the gravamen test)75 in the Frys’
favor, given the lack of a fact record in front of that court as well as
the Supreme Court’s lack of analysis on the definition of related
services.76
In the Frys’ response to the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, they argued the defendants essentially ignored the new
standard set forth by the Supreme Court and the limited scope of the
remand—to examine the history of the proceedings to determine
70

Id. at 20-22.
Id. at 22-23.
72 Id. at 24-25.
73 Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Partial Motion for Summary Judgment, Fry v.
Napoleon Cmty. Sch., No. 12-15507 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2018) [hereinafter Defendants’
Response, March 2018].
74 Id. at 11. The defendants cited to the IDEA regulations discussed in their motion for
summary judgment supporting the premise that “the IDEA requires schools to develop the
student’s ability to move around the environment as part of their special education program.”
Id. at 13. The defendants also asserted there was a significant volume of direct evidence
supporting the argument that the Frys viewed allowing Wonder to accompany Ehlena was
necessary to ensure she received a FAPE. Id. at 20-21.
75 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
76 Defendants’ Response, March 2018, supra note 73, at 25-26.
71
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whether plaintiffs invoked the IDEA’s administrative remedies prior
to filing a lawsuit.77 The Frys reiterated that the circumstances
surrounding their participation in the IDEA procedures did not
establish the gravamen of their complaint related to a denial of a
FAPE.78
The Frys also responded to the defendants’ response to the
Frys’ motion for partial summary judgment.79 The Frys reiterated
some of the arguments in their response to the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment80 and claimed that if the defendants’ argument was
adopted it would lead to perverse results—essentially it would allow
schools to convene an IEP meeting any time a child receiving special
education services requests an ADA accommodation, leading to the
requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies.81
The
defendants’ reply brief in support of their motion for summary
judgment also reiterated the arguments set forth in their motion for
summary judgment and refuted the claim by the Frys that adoption of
its argument would have perverse results.82

77 Plaintiffs’ Brief in Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 12-14, 2829, Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., No. 12-15507 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2018).
78 Id. at 18-28. In addition, the Frys argued the defendants would not be entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law even in the event the defendants proved their allegations because
of the application of the gravamen test. Id. at 17-18.
79 Plaintiffs’ Reply to Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment to Dismiss Defendants’ Affirmative Defense of Failure to Exhaust Administrative
Remedies, Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., No. 12-15507 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 16, 2018) [hereinafter
Plaintiffs’ Reply to Defendants’ Response].
80 Id. at 7-10. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (discussing arguments,
including that the defendants are not applying the Supreme Court’s gravamen test).
81 Plaintiffs’ Reply to Defendants’ Response, supra note 79, at 11-12. The Frys also
articulated a school could deny any ADA accommodation request on the basis it is
“educationally unnecessary” rather than the standard of “unreasonable” under the ADA. Id.
at 11.
82 Defendants, Napoleon Community Schools, Jackson County ISD and Pamela Barnes’
Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 7-8, Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch.,
No. 12-15507 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 19, 2018). The defendants argued that the IDEA
administrative procedure is the most expedited process and puts the student and the student’s
education first with the least disturbance. Id. at 7. The defendants also contended that the
Frys’ approach would view accommodations narrowly, which is counter to the view of the
Supreme Court that school districts should view special education services broadly. Id. at 8.
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Rulings on Motions for Summary
Judgment

The district court denied both motions for summary judgment
without prejudice.83 In denying the motions, the district court cited to
gaps in the evidence necessary to support facts alleged by the parties.84
The district court agreed with the Supreme Court’s application of the
hypothetical questions relating to access85 that the Frys’ complaint is
“not seeking relief for the denial of a FAPE,” thus the history of the
proceedings is the “clue” to be analyzed.86 Because of the lack of
evidence regarding the reasons the Frys “changed course” the district
court determined “a summary judgment ruling is not appropriate at this
time.”87 At the time of the writing of this Article, the parties had not
settled this case, and, unless the district court grants a new motion for
summary judgment, it appears likely the parties will continue the
litigation until a conclusive decision by the district court.88
D.

Examples of Cases Involving Service Animals
Applying the Fry Analysis

At the time of the writing of this Article, there were only a few
cases relating to service animals in schools with reported opinions
applying the Fry analysis.89 In the Doucette v. Jacobs case, a
Massachusetts district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ federal claims
relating to allowing a student to be accompanied by a service animal,
concluding “that the gravamen of the Doucettes’ federal claims are for
the denial of a FAPE, and, therefore, that they had to exhaust their
administrative remedies.”90 The Doucette court found the entire
83

Opinion & Order Denying Motions for Summary Judgment Without Prejudice, Fry v.
Napoleon Cmty. Sch., No. 12-15507, 2018 WL 4030757, *1, *16 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 23, 2018).
84 Id. at *8, *13.
85 See supra note 41 and accompanying text (setting forth two hypothetical questions).
86 Fry, 2018 WL 4030757, at *15.
87 Id. at *16.
88 Plaintiffs’ Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Dismiss Defendants’
Affirmative Defense of Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies, Fry v. Napoleon Cmty.
Sch., No. 12-15507 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 25, 2018).
89 See infra notes 90-96 and accompanying text (discussing cases applying the Fry analysis
involving service animals in schools).
90 Doucette v. Jacobs, 288 F. Supp. 3d 459, 472 (D. Mass. 2018). The federal claim relevant
to the discussion in this Article was a claim of discrimination under Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act based on the school’s refusal to permit the student access to his service dog.
Id. The Doucettes have appealed the district court decision. Brief of the Plaintiffs-Appellants,
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complaint was based on the student’s IEP in addition to citing to
evidence that the plaintiffs utilized the IDEA’s procedures to handle
the dispute.91
The New Hampshire District Court also dealt with this issue in
the A.R. v. School Administrative Unit #23 (hereinafter “Riley”) case.92
Riley dealt with a request, not to allow the service animal, but to
provide a handler for the service animal while the student is at school.93
A 2015 Report and Recommendation by a Magistrate Judge in the
Riley case held the Rileys had not met their burden establishing a
strong likelihood that they would prevail in their ADA and
Rehabilitation Act claims at the preliminary injunction stage, but did
not require exhaustion of administrative remedies under the IDEA.94
The Rileys continued the litigation, and, after the Fry decision, the
district court requested the parties provide memoranda addressing
whether exhaustion of administrative remedies was required.95 In
October 2017 the district court issued an order finding “[t]o the extent
the relief sought by the plaintiffs might be available at all, it is only
available under the IDEA.”96
Notwithstanding the complicated history of the existing cases
relating to the intertwined nature of the IDEA and ADA, there has been
some clarification in recent years regarding the application of the

Rachel Doucette, for Herself and Minor Son, B.D.; Michael Doucette, for Himself and Minor
Son, B.D., Doucette v. Jacobs, No. 18-1160 (1st Cir. June 4, 2018). The case was argued on
September 6, 2018 before the United States Court of Appeals of the First Circuit.
91 Doucette, 288 F. Supp. 3d at 473. The Doucette court also found the plaintiffs were not
excused from the IDEA exhaustion requirement for their federal claims on the basis of futility
or undue burden. Id. at 475-77.
92 A.R. v. Sch. Admin. Unit #23, No. 15-cv-152-SM, 2017 WL 4621587 (D.N.H. Oct. 12,
2017).
93 Id. at *1.
94 See Riley v. Sch. Admin. Unit #23, No. 15-cv-152-SM, 2015 WL 9806795, at *7, *14
(D.N.H. Dec. 22, 2015); Order, Riley v. Sch. Admin. Unit #23, No. 15-cv-152-SM, 2016 WL
183525 (D.N.H. Jan. 14, 2016) (approving the Report and Recommendation). See infra notes
125-33 and accompanying text (discussing application of ADA regulations in a school
environment regarding who controls the service animal).
95 Order, Riley v. Sch. Admin. Unit #23, No 15-cv-152-SM (D.N.H. Mar. 10, 2017) (stating
the “relief that is also (and perhaps only) available under the IDEA, thus requiring plaintiffs
to first exhaust the IDEA’s available administrative procedures” and requesting written
memoranda to show cause why the case should not be stayed or dismissed).
96 A.R., 2017 WL 4621587, at *6. The Rileys have appealed this order to the First Circuit
Court of Appeals. Brief of Appellants Jamie Riley and Allen Riley, No. 17-2106 (1st Cir.
May 31, 2018).
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ADA’s service animal regulations in the context of the school
environment.97
III.

ISSUES RELATING TO THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT SERVICE ANIMAL REGULATIONS

The ability to exclude service animals entirely is unlikely to be
successful because the school district would need to show that it would
be a fundamental alteration of the program or service to modify a noanimals policy.98 Given the premise in the Titles II and III service
animal regulations that “[g]enerally [an entity] shall modify its
policies, practices, or procedures to permit the use of a service animal
by an individual with a disability,” it is necessary for school districts
to consider whether a particular aspect of the service animal
regulations—including a contention that an animal does not meet the
definition of service animal—supports an argument that an animal can
be excluded.99
This Part first sets forth the definition of service animal under
Titles II and III of the ADA, then considers a few of the issues that
have recently arisen in cases involving students who request their
service animals be allowed to accompany them to school.100 The

97

See infra notes 98-134 and accompanying text (discussing ADA regulations and cases).
28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (2018); 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(a) (2018) (requiring modification unless
the entity could demonstrate making such modification would fundamentally alter the program
or service). An example of a situation where it could be a fundamental alteration in a program
or service to allow service animals is a school for visually-impaired students that is based on
a specific model called “nonvisual” where no visual aids are permitted (including service dogs
because the student is then relying on the dog’s vision). Dohmen v. Iowa Dep’t for the Blind,
794 N.W.2d 295, 311-12, (Iowa Ct. App. 2010).
99 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(a) (2018); 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(c) (2018). A court rejected an
argument by a school district that the DOJ exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating the
service animal regulation. Alboniga v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty. Fla., 87 F. Supp. 3d 1319
(S.D. Fla. 2015). The Alboniga court determined the Title II service animal regulations were
“clearly a permissible interpretation of the ADA” and were “valid, [and] internally consistent.”
Id. at 1334, 1337. Essentially the service animal regulations were a “specific application of
the reasonable modifications [] requirement.” Id. at 1333. The same arguments are applied
when a teacher requests a modification to allow a service animal in the classroom. E.g., Clark
v. Sch. Dist. Five of Lexington & Richland Ctys., 247 F. Supp. 3d 734, 741 (D.S.C. 2017).
See also Rebecca J. Huss, Canines at the Company, Felines at the Factory: The Risks and
Rewards of Incorporating Service Animals and Companion Animals into the Workplace, 123
DICKINSON L. REV. 363, 381-83 (2019) [hereinafter Huss, Workplace] (discussing the Clark
case).
100 See infra notes 107-33 and accompanying text (discussing ADA cases). The author has
written about several cases in previous articles and will not repeat the analysis provided
98
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coverage of this Part of the Article is focused on regulations and
litigation brought by parents on behalf of their children.101 However,
as advocates and school districts are aware, the Department of
Education (DOE) and Department of Justice (DOJ) both have
jurisdiction to investigate complaints of disability discrimination
allegedly occurring in the school environment.102
A.

Definition of Service Animal Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act

The Title II and Title III ADA regulations regarding service
animals essentially mirror each other.103 Service animal is defined as
“any dog that is individually trained to do work or perform tasks for
the benefit of an individual with a disability, including a physical,
sensory, psychiatric, intellectual, or other mental disability.”104 The
regulations provide examples of the type of work or tasks that can be
performed by service animals and require such work or tasks to be
“directly related to an individual’s disability.”105 In addition, “the
provision of emotional support, well-being, comfort, or

therein. Huss, After Fry, supra note 9, at 68-72; Huss, Revisited, supra note 3, at 14-27; Huss,
Classroom, supra note 9, at 23-40.
101 See supra notes 103-33 and accompanying text (discussing regulation and issues raised
in litigation).
102 Information About Filing a Complaint with the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights
Division and U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/09/22/filecomp.pdf (last visited
Sept. 22, 2018) (discussing the mission, goals and processes of both agencies); How to File a
Complaint, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/crt/how-file-complaint (last visited
Sept. 22, 2018) (setting forth the work of the Educational Opportunities section of the DOJ);
How to File a Discrimination Complaint with the Office for Civil Rights, U.S. DEP’T EDUC.,
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/howto.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2018)
(discussing the laws the Office for Civil Rights enforces). See also Huss, Revisited, supra
note 3, at 27-36 (analyzing the jurisdiction by these government agencies and examples of
administrative actions taken by them against school districts).
103 28 C.F.R. § 35.136 (2018) (Title II regulations); 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(c) (2018) (Title III
regulations).
104 28 C.F.R. § 35.104; 28 C.F.R. § 36.104. Although an entity is required to use assessment
factors to determine whether a miniature horse should be allowed into a facility, no other
species of animal qualifies as a “service animal” under the Title II and Title III regulations.
28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104, 35.136(i); 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.104, 36.302(c)(9).
105 28 C.F.R. § 35.104; 28 C.F.R. § 36.104. It is clear in the regulations that service animals
can be used by individuals with a wide range of disabilities including “helping persons with
psychiatric and neurological disabilities by preventing or interrupting impulsive or destructive
behaviors.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.104; 28 C.F.R. § 36.104.
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companionship do not constitute work or tasks” under the Titles II and
III regulation definition.106
B.

How “Individually Trained” Does a Service
Animal Need to Be?

Both teachers and students have requested the ability to bring
a service animal in training to school.107 Because the ADA service
animal regulation does not apply to service animals in training, the
right of an individual to bring an animal in training to school is
dependent on state law.108 To be more specific, if the person training
the animal is not an individual with a disability, a state law is the only

106 28 C.F.R. § 35.104; 28 C.F.R. § 36.104. But see infra note 137 and accompanying text
(discussing how an animal providing emotional support may be allowed at school as part of a
student’s IEP). The ADA Titles II and III definition of service animal is more restrictive than
the likely interpretation of service animal under Title I of the ADA. Huss, Workplace, supra
note 99, at 374-79. In addition, it is clear that the Department of Housing and Urban
Development’s (hereinafter “HUD”) definition of “assistance animal” for purposes of
accommodation under the Fair Housing Amendments Act includes emotional support animals.
Service Animals and Assistance Animals for People with Disabilities in Housing and HUDFunded Programs, FHEO 2013-01, HUD OFFICE FAIR HOUSING & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (Apr.
25, 2013), https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/SERVANIMALS_NTCFHEO2013-01.PDF
(defining assistance animal as one who “works, provides assistance, or performs tasks for the
benefit of a person with a disability, or provides emotional support that alleviates one or more
identified symptoms or effects of a person’s disability”).
107 Christina Lorey, Iowa Students Training Puppy as a Service Dog, WQAD,
http://wqad.com/2017/09/20/iowa-students-training-puppy-as-a-service-dog/ (last updated
Sept. 20, 2017, 8:27 PM) (providing an example of a school district that allows a teacher to
bring in a service dog-in-training and how the students assist with the training); Jeffrey
Solochek, Teacher Asks Pasco County School Board to Revise Its Policy on Service Animals,
TAMPA BAY TIMES (Apr. 18, 2018), http://www.tampabay.com/blogs/gradebook/2018/04/18/
teacher-asks-pasco-county-school-board-to-revise-its-policy-on-service-animals/ (providing
an example of a request to allow a teacher to bring a service animal-in-training to school). See
also Huss, Classroom, supra note 9, at 55-59 (discussing service animals-in-training in school
environments, including describing a program supported by a school where students train
service animals).
108 Frequently Asked Questions about Service Animals and the ADA, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE,
C.R. DIVISION, at Q6, July 20, 2015, https://www.ada.gov/regs2010/service_animal_qa.pdf
[hereinafter DOJ FAQ] (answering “no” to the question “[a]re service-animals-in-training
considered service animals under the ADA”). See also Huss, Classroom, supra note 9, at 5560 (analyzing issues relating to service animals-in-training in school environment); Rebecca
J. Huss, A Conundrum for Animal Activists: Can or Should the Current Legal Classification
of Certain Animals Be Utilized to Improve the Lives of All Animals? The Intersection of
Federal Disability Laws and Breed Discriminatory Legislation, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1561,
1593-97 (2015) [hereinafter Huss, Conundrum] (analyzing the service animals-in-training
issue). Most states have provided for individuals with service animals-in-training to have
access to public accommodations under their state anti-discrimination laws. Id.
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possible pathway to access.109 State anti-discrimination laws may
exclude schools from the list of public accommodations or entities that
are covered by such laws.110
However, because the definition of service animal under the
ADA only requires the animal to be “individually trained” to do work
or perform tasks,111 it is possible for disputes to arise regarding the
minimum level of training for dogs partnered with students with
disabilities.112 Because service animals may need continued training
during the time they are partnered with an individual with a disability,
and the work or tasks a service animal performs may change, the initial
focus would be on whether there is any work or task being performed
by the service animal for the benefit of the student with a disability.113

109 See, e.g., Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Buchanan, 924 P.2d 716 (Nev. 1996) (analyzing the
right of a teacher to bring a service animal-in-training to school under state law); Naegle v.
Canyons Sch. Dist., No. 2:17-cv-23-DB, 2018 WL 2376336, at *3 (D. Utah May 24, 2018)
(holding “Utah law does not require a school district to allow a service animal in training
accompanied by a non-disabled student”).
110 E.g., Naegle, 2018 WL 2376336, at *4 (finding the public places in the Utah statute
requiring accommodations that would allow service animals-in-training “do not include a
classroom” in a case where a non-disabled student requested to be allowed to bring a service
animal-in-training to school).
111
See supra notes 104-05 (providing definition of service animals); DOJ, FAQ, supra note
108, at Q6 (stating “[u]nder the ADA, the dog must already be trained before it can be taken
into public places”). Individual training can come in a variety of forms. For example, in 2017
the DOE OCR found a school district violated Title II of the ADA by including in its policy a
requirement that a service animal be provided individual training “even if group or some other
type of training would be sufficient under the regulation.” Mary Beth McLeod, Program
Manager, OCR Complaint #09-16-7004, Letter to David Vierra, Superintendent, Antelope
Valley Union High School District, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., OFFICE FOR C.R. (May 4, 2017), at 5,
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/investigations/more/09167004-a.pdf
[hereinafter Letter from Mary Beth McLeod].
112 For example, in 2015 a school district entered into a Voluntary Resolution Agreement
with the DOE OCR due to a complaint arising after an individual described her service animal
as “in training” and the school administrator was confused over whether the person with the
animal was training the animal for use by another individual. Barbara Wery, Team Leader,
Letter to Kurt Hilyard, Superintendent, Union Gap School District No. 2, U.S. DEP’T EDUC.,
OFFICE FOR C.R. (Aug. 28, 2015), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/investigatio
ns/more/09167004-a.pdf. See also Huss, Revisited, supra note 3, at 42-43 (describing a
conflict that occurred when a teacher believed a student’s service dog was not properly
trained).
113 Cf. United States v. Dental Dreams, LLC, 307 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1249-50 (D.N.M. 2018)
(acknowledging a service dog was still in training but finding evidence that the animal would
perform some work for the benefit of the plaintiff in an employment dispute applying Title III
of the ADA).
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Impact on Others in the Classroom

It is not unusual for school districts to argue that allowing a
service animal in the classroom would have a detrimental impact on
others in the building.114 DOJ guidance articulates “[a]llergies and fear
of dogs are not valid reasons for denying access . . . to people using
service animals.”115 The DOJ guidance states if a person who is
allergic to dogs and a person using a service animal must be in the
same room, “they both should be accommodated by assigning them, if
possible, to different locations within the room or different rooms.”116
This can be an especially complicated issue for school districts as there
may be students with allergies to animals, but other students may use
service animals to ensure that their environment is free of allergens
(such as peanuts).117
A service animal can be excluded if the animal is “out of
control and the animal’s handler does not take effective action to

114 E.g., C.C. v. Cypress Sch. Dist., No. SACV 11-352 AG (MLGx), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
88287 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2011) (providing an example of a case where school district raised
concerns about impact on other students if a student was accompanied by his service animal).
Parents of children with allergies may also raise concerns. Thomas E. Ciapusci, Supervisory
Team Leader, Letter to Nancy Hall, Executive President, West Gilbert Charter Elementary
School, Inc., U.S. DEP’T EDUC., OFFICE FOR C.R. (June 30, 2015), https://www2.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/ocr/docs/investigations/more/08141282-a.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Thomas E.
Ciapusci] (reporting on investigation triggered by parent of child with allergies who
complained her child was negatively impacted by another student being allowed to bring a
service animal to school). Cf. Greene v. New England Suzuki Inst., No. 2:18-cv-00141-JAW,
2018 WL 3097320 (D. Me. June, 22 2018) (discussing dispute between parents of child with
allergies to furred animals and summer camp allowing visiting animals).
115 Service Animals, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, C.R. DIVISION (July 12, 2011), https://www.ada.g
ov/service_animals_2010.htm [hereinafter DOJ, Service Animals].
116 Id. (using a school classroom as an example of this situation). Examples of other actions
a school may take are additional cleaning, adjustment of traffic patterns, and installation of
filters. Letter from Thomas E. Ciapusci, supra note 114, at 3. The West Gilbert Charter
Elementary School, Inc., was found in violation, notwithstanding the measures it took to
address concerns of a parent of a student with allergies, because it did not evaluate the student
for eligibility for services under Section 504, although the DOE OCR did not take a position
on whether the student with the allergy or asthma is a student with a disability. Letter from
Thomas E. Ciapusci, supra note 114, at 6.
117 Resolution Agreement, XXX County School Dist., OCR Docket Number 04-13-1318,
U.S. DEP’T EDUC., OFFICE FOR C.R. (Apr. 2, 2014), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/
docs/investigations/more/04131318-b.pdf (providing an example of a Resolution Agreement
entered into between the DOE OCR and a school district relating to a student who needs a
peanut-free environment and utilizes a service animal and the actions that should be taken if
others in the building are allergic to the animal).
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control it.”118 Although there is no specific language in the Titles II
and III regulations relating to when a service animal is a threat, there
is a definition of “direct threat” in the regulations.119 Direct threat is
defined as “a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot
be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures,
or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services.”120 In order to
determine the risk, the regulations require an entity to make an
individualized assessment using objective evidence.121 In addition,
entities are required to consider the probability of an injury occurring
and the “nature, duration, and severity of the risk.”122
When considering whether a particular animal is a threat,
school districts cannot exclude such animal from the premises merely
based on the breed of a dog.123 The DOJ’s guidance on the ADA
118 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(b) (2018); 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(c)(2) (2018). A school district may
also exclude an animal if the animal is not housebroken. Id. However, a rare “accident” by a
service animal is likely insufficient to show an animal is not housebroken. Thomas A. Mayes,
ADA Regulations on Service Animals, Memorandum to the Division of Learning and Results,
AEA Directors of Special Education, IOWA DEP’T EDUC. (Sept. 19, 2013), at 3,
https://www.educateiowa.gov/sites/files/ed/documents/Service%20Animal%20Guidance.pdf
[hereinafter Mayes Memorandum] (stating “an individual’s IEP team may . . . determine that
a comfort or emotional support animal is required to provide a FAPE to an eligible
individual”).
119 When the DOJ was revising the service animal regulations, it considered adding
language allowing for exclusion of the service animal if the animal posed “a direct threat to
the health or safety of others”; however, the DOJ did not include this language in the final
regulations, stating it believed the general “direct threat” language in the regulations was
sufficient. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government
Services, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,164, 56,197 (Sept. 15, 2010) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35)
[hereinafter Title II Regulation Guidance]; Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by
Public Accommodations and in Commercial Facilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,236, 56,271 (Sept. 15,
2010) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 36) [hereinafter Title III Regulation Guidance] (providing
guidance on and implementing the final regulations for Title II and Title III of the ADA).
120 28 C.F.R. § 35.104; 28 C.F.R. § 36.104.
121 28 C.F.R. § 35.139; 28 C.F.R. § 36.208.
122 28 C.F.R. § 35.139; 28 C.F.R. § 36.208.
123 The DOJ’s guidance to the ADA Title II and Title III regulations states:
The Department does not believe that it is either appropriate or consistent
with the ADA to defer to local laws that prohibit certain breeds of dogs
based on local concerns that these breeds may have a history of
unprovoked aggression or attacks. Such deference would have the effect
of limiting the rights of persons with disabilities under the ADA who use
certain service animals based on where they live rather than on whether
the use of a particular animal poses a direct threat to the health and safety
of others.
Title II Regulation Guidance, supra note 119, at 56,194; Title III Regulation Guidance, supra
note 119, at 56,268 (implementing the final regulations for Title II and Title III of the ADA
and providing guidance on changes in the regulations). See also Frequently Asked Questions
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regulations addressed this issue, and it determined excluding an animal
solely based on the breed of the dog is inconsistent with the ADA—in
fact, it concluded such a restriction would “have the unintended effect
of screening out the very breeds of dogs that have successfully served
as service animals for decades.”124
D.

Responsibility for and Control of the Service
Animal

The Title II and Title III regulations state an entity “is not
responsible for the care or supervision of a service animal.”125 Care
and supervision has been interpreted by one court as “feeding,
watering, walking or washing the animal.”126 The ADA regulations
also state “[a] service animal shall be under the control of its
handler.”127 The DOJ has provided limited guidance interpreting what
being “under control” means.128 The DOJ recognizes that generally
“the handler will be the individual with a disability or a third party who
accompanies the individual with a disability.”129 In settings such as
primary and secondary schools, DOJ guidance articulates “the school
or similar entity may need to provide some assistance to enable a
particular student to handle his or her service animal.”130
Case law illustrating the extent to which a student must control
an animal in order to be considered a handler has established a fairly
About Service Animals and the ADA, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, C.R. DIVISION (July 20, 2015),
https://www.ada.gov/regs2010/service_animal_qa.html (stating the “ADA does not restrict
the type of dog breeds that can be service animals . . . [and a] service animal may not be
excluded based on assumptions or stereotypes about the animal’s breed or how the animal
might behave”). See also Huss, Conundrum, supra note 108, at 1574-87 (analyzing why
breed-discriminatory legislation cannot be applied to individuals utilizing service animals
under the ADA).
124 Title II Regulation Guidance, supra note 119, at 56,194; Title III Regulation Guidance,
supra note 119, at 56,268 (citing to jurisdictions with laws restricting German Shepherds).
The DOJ guidance also cites to regulations that prohibit animals over a certain weight that
have the effect of restricting breeds even in the absence of an express breed ban. Title II
Regulation Guidance, supra note 119, at 56,191; Title III Regulation Guidance, supra note
119, at 56,268.
125 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(e); 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(c)(5).
126 Alboniga v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty. Fla., 87 F. Supp. 3d 1319, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 2015);
see also Huss, After Fry, supra note 9, at 72 (discussing care or supervision requirement).
127 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(d); 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(c)(4).
128 DOJ, FAQ, supra note 108, at Q27 (answering question “[w]hat does under control
mean?”).
129 Id.
130 Id.
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broad interpretation of the ADA regulation language.131 If a handler is
unable to use a harness, leash or other tether, the handler can use other
“effective means” such as voice control or signals to control the
animal.132 However, when a student cannot be physically connected
to the animal (such as via tether), and cannot otherwise control the
animal, an issue arises whether the ADA regulation that the animal is
under the handler’s control is being met.133
If a student’s request to bring an animal to school can be denied
because the animal does not meet the definition of service animal, or
the circumstances are such that another of the ADA regulations would
allow for the exclusion of the animal, the IDEA may be a way to use
federal law to support the claim.134
IV.

WHY THE IDEA MAY SUPPORT A STUDENT’S REQUEST FOR
A SERVICE ANIMAL EVEN IF THE ADA DOES NOT

Because of the exhaustion of administrative remedies
requirement in the IDEA, advocates of students partnered with service
animals logically would choose to argue the ADA, rather than the
IDEA, is applicable to the request for modification of a no-animalsallowed policy at a school.135 However, as discussed above, there are
circumstances under which the ADA would not support a claim for
access.136
For example, during the process of developing an IEP, the IEP
team may determine, even if an animal does not meet the definition of
service animal under the ADA, it is appropriate for an emotional
support animal to be allowed at the school in order for the student to
receive a FAPE.137

131

See Huss, After Fry, supra note 9, at 67-73.
28 C.F.R. § 35.136(d); 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(c)(4).
133 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(d); 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(c)(4).
134 See infra notes 135-48 and accompanying text (analyzing why allowing an animal may
be part of an IEP or required to provide a FAPE). As discussed in previous articles, state laws
may provide additional rights to students with disabilities. Huss, Revisited, supra note 3, at
41-46; Huss, Classroom, supra note 9, at 46-51.
135 See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing the argument made by the
defendants in the Fry case that the ability to bring Wonder to school was appropriately raised
in the context of Ehlena’s IEP under the IDEA).
136 See supra notes 107-34 and accompanying text (discussing issues under the ADA).
137 Mayes Memorandum, supra note 118, at 2. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying
text (defining service animal).
132
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As highlighted in defendants’ arguments in the Fry case,138
providing special education and related services to prepare students for
independent living is listed as one of the purposes of the IDEA.139 The
definition of “special education” in the IDEA regulations includes
“travel training.”140 Travel training is defined in the regulation as the
provision of:
instruction, as appropriate, to children with significant
cognitive disabilities, and any other children with
disabilities who require this instruction, to enable them
to— . . . (ii) [l]earn the skills necessary to move
effectively and safely from place to place within that
environment (e.g., in school, in the home, at work, and
in the community).141
Related services in the IDEA regulations include orientation and
mobility related services.142 This definition is specifically related to
visually-impaired students; however, one example of note provided in
the regulations is teaching children “[t]o use . . . a service animal . . .
as a tool for safely negotiating the environment for children with no
available travel vision.”143 Another “related service” defined in the
IDEA regulations is physical and occupational therapy as well as other
supportive services.144 Occupational therapy includes “improving the
ability to perform tasks for independent functioning if functions are
impaired or lost.”145

138 See supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text (discussing arguments made by the
defendants on remand).
139 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2018) (stating as a purpose of the chapter “to ensure that all
children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that
emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and
prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living”).
140 34 C.F.R. § 300.39(a)(2)(ii) (2018).
141 Id. § 300.39(b)(4). Special education also includes instruction in physical education. Id.
§ 300.39(a)(1)(ii). Physical education is defined as “A) [p]hysical and motor fitness; B)
[f]undamental motor skills and patterns; and . . . [includes] movement education.” Id. §
300.39(b)(2).
142 Id. § 300.34(a), (c)(7).
143 Id. § 300.34(c)(7).
144 Id. § 300.34(a).
145 Id. § 300.34(c)(6). An additional possible related service that might serve to support
service animal access in order to receive a FAPE is the requirement for transportation that is
necessary to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education. Id. § 300.34(a).
Transportation includes “[t]ravel in and around school buildings” as well as to and from
school. Id. § 300.34(c)(16).
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The DOE, while articulating the right of a student to use a
service animal is independent of the student’s ability to receive a
FAPE, has acknowledged that “a student’s receipt of a FAPE may be
enhanced or supplemented by the use of a service animal, a service
animal is not required in any way to enhance or increase the student’s
ability to receive or the actual receipt of a FAPE.”146
However, because a FAPE includes special education and
related services, provided in conformity with an IEP, given how
broadly special education and related services are defined, it is
arguable in order to provide a particular student a FAPE (rather than
enhance or increase the student’s ability to receive a FAPE), allowing
the student to be accompanied by a service animal may be required
under the IDEA.147 In addition, as illustrated in the Riley case,
discussed supra, if providing a handler for a service animal is required
in order for a student to receive a FAPE (even if access has already
been granted), it could be required under the IDEA.148
V.

CONCLUSION

With the Supreme Court’s decision in the Fry case, advocates
for students and school districts now have a standard to apply when
determining whether the ADA or IDEA applies to a claim by a student
that he or she should be allowed to bring a service animal to school.149
Over time disputes centered on whether advocates are required to
exhaust administrative procedures under the IDEA should diminish as
cases provide interpretations of the gravamen standard—if advocates
are thoughtful about how to approach school districts with their
requests for either access under the ADA or assistance in learning
under the IDEA.150

146

Letter from Mary Beth McLeod, supra note 111.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2018).
148 Brief of Appellee School Administrative Unit #23, a/k/a/ SAU #23 at 5, Riley v. School
Admin. Unit #23, No. 17-2106 (1st Cir. June 7, 2018) (arguing that the dispute regarding a
school district’s obligation to provide a handler for a service dog is one of related services of
educational support and thus IDEA exhaustion is necessary); Mayes Memorandum, supra note
118, at 7 (emphasizing that “providing the handler must be necessary to receive a FAPE, not
merely beneficial, helpful, or advisable”).
149 See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text (setting forth the standard established by
the Supreme Court).
150 See supra notes 135-48 and accompanying text (considering aspects of the IDEA that
may support inclusion of a service animal at school).
147
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School districts should also note the evolving analysis
regarding the application of the ADA service animal regulations.151 As
the focus of cases shifts from whether the IDEA exhaustion of
administrative procedures is required to the substance of the requests,
school districts need to ensure that they do not run afoul of the ADA
by applying policies or procedures that do not reflect current legal
standards.152

151

See supra notes 98-134 and accompanying text (analyzing issues involving the ADA
regulations).
152 E.g., Letter from Mary Beth McLeod, supra note 111, at 5 (providing an example of a
school district that the DOE OCR determined violated Title II by including requirements in its
policy not permitted by the ADA service animal regulations, such as a requirement for liability
insurance and vaccinations in excess of state and local law); Huss, After Fry, supra note 9, at
73 (discussing a case interpreting a prohibition of surcharges regulation).
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